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The notion of distortion in social choice problems
has been defined to measure the loss in efficiency—
typically measured by the utilitarian social welfare,
the sum of utilities of the participating agents—
due to having access only to limited information
about the preferences of the agents. We survey the
most significant results of the literature on distor-
tion from the past 15 years, and highlight important
open problems and the most promising avenues of
ongoing and future work.
1 Introduction
Social choice theory is concerned with aggregating the prefer-
ences of individuals into a desirable collective decision, and
has many applications such as choosing an electoral candi-
date, a public policy, the recipient of an award, or something
as simple as choosing the most appropriate time for a meet-
ing. Founded in the classic theory of Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern [1953], these preferences are typically assumed to
be captured by utility functions, which assign numerical val-
ues to the different options, indicating the intensity by which
an individual prefers one possible outcome to another. While
the existence of such a cardinal utility structure is rarely dis-
puted, the predominant approach in social choice theory is to
elicit more limited preference information from the partici-
pants; in particular, they are usually required to provide or-
dinal preference rankings over the different outcomes. This
is primarily due to cognitive reasons, as it is much more con-
ceivable to come up with a ranking based on comparisons
rather than a numerical utility structure.
The inevitable loss of information due to the restricted ex-
pressiveness of the preferences makes it rather challenging to
optimize objectives of a cardinal nature. A natural such ob-
jective is the maximization of the (utilitarian) social welfare,
defined as the sum of the individual utilities for the chosen
outcome. How can we make the right choice when we do
not have access to the utilities themselves? As the following
example demonstrates, there are cases in which we cannot.
Example 1. Consider a simple scenario, with two outcomes
a and b. The ordinal preferences of the participants are such
that half of them prefer a to b, and the remaining half prefer b
to a. In such a case, based only on these ordinal preferences,
it is impossible to distinguish between the two outcomes, and
thus either of them could be selected. So, let us us assume
that the winner is a. The unknown underlying utilities of the
participants for the outcomes might be such that those that
prefer a to b are mostly indifferent between the two, and have
utility about 1/2 for each of them, whereas the remaining par-
ticipants strongly prefer b, and have utility 1 for b and 0 for a.
Consequently, the total utility of the participants for the win-
ner a is only about n/4 and their utility for b is 3n/4, where n
is the number of participants. This shows that a is clearly not
the optimal choice, and in fact only achieves a social welfare
that is a multiplicative factor of 3 away from the optimal.
While Example 1 makes it obvious that selecting the out-
come that maximizes the social welfare is not always possi-
ble, it does not conclusively answer the question of how far
away from the optimal outcome our choice can be. Driven
by the principles of worst-case analysis and approximation
algorithms, a large part of the computational social choice
literature [Brandt et al., 2016] has studied questions about
computing the best outcome for many fundamental social
choice problems. In particular, in 2006 Procaccia and Rosen-
schein [2006] defined the notion of the distortion to measure
the worst-case deterioration of an aggregate cardinal objec-
tive, such as utilitarian social welfare, in social choice set-
tings, due to having access to preferences of limited expres-
siveness, particularly ordinal rankings. The associated re-
search agenda posed the following fundamental question:
Which social choice functions achieve the best possible dis-
tortion for a given cardinal objective?
Over the past 15 years, this type of question has been stud-
ied extensively in the context of many different social choice
problems, such as general single-winner elections, elections
with metric preferences, committee selection, participatory
budgeting, and matching, thus giving rise to a rich and vibrant
literature at the intersection of economics, computation, and
artificial intelligence. In this survey, we highlight the most
significant of these results, some current open problems, as
well as the most prominent ongoing and future directions.
2 Normalized Social Choice
The first works on the distortion of social choice rules follow-
ing Procaccia and Rosenschein [2006] studied the setting of
single-winner elections with normalized utilities. In this set-
ting, there is a setN of n agents and a setA ofm alternatives.
Every agent i ∈ N has a value vij ∈ R≥0 for every alterna-
tive j ∈ A; let v = (vij)i∈N,j∈A. These values are usually
assumed to be unit-sum normalized so that
∑
j∈A vij = 1
for every agent i ∈ N . We refer the reader to the note of
Aziz [2020] for justifications of such normalization assump-
tions. Given these values, the goal is to compute the alterna-
tive that maximizes the social welfare, which for any alterna-
tive j ∈ A is defined as the total value of the agents for j,
i.e., SW(j|v) =
∑
i∈N vij . It is important to note that while
this setting is referred to as an “election”, and the associated
terminology is used, it can broadly capture most decision-
making scenarios, where a possible outcome corresponds to
an alternative and a participant corresponds to an agent.
If we had access to the values of the agents, maximizing
the social welfare would be an easy task; we could simply
compute the social welfare of every alternative and then se-
lect the one with the largest social welfare. However, the val-
ues are the agents’ private information; they are unknown to
the designer and it might be the case that they are even un-
known to the agents themselves. This stems from the moti-
vation presented in the Introduction, namely that coming up
with these values is a cognitively demanding task, which the
agents are not often asked to partake in. Instead, we have
access to the linear orderings defined by the values. Specif-
ically, every agent i ∈ N is associated with a (strict) rank-
ing i over the alternatives such that j i j′ implies that
vij ≥ vij′ ; let v= (i)i∈N . These rankings are given as
input to a social choice function (or voting rule) f , which de-
cides a single winning alternative f(v) ∈ A. The distortion
of f measures how far away the alternative f(v) is from the
optimal alternative in the worst case. Formally, it is defined as
the worst-case ratio (over all possible instances) of the maxi-
mum social welfare over the social welfare of the alternative






For this setting, Procaccia and Rosenschein [2006] showed
that the distortion of the well-known Borda voting rule is un-
bounded. Another well-known and in fact simpler voting rule
is the following.
Voting Rule (Plurality). Elect the alternative that the most
agents consider their favorite one, breaking ties arbitrarily.
Caragiannis and Procaccia [2011] showed that the Plurality
rule has a distortion of O(m2); this bound was later proven
to be best possible among all deterministic voting rules [Cara-
giannis et al., 2017]. To give the reader a soft introduction to
the type of arguments used to bound the distortion of voting
rules, we provide a sketch of the rather simple arguments used
for Plurality. We remark that proving bounds on the distortion
may require rather involved arguments in general depending
on the setting and the type of rules considered.
Theorem. The distortion of Plurality is O(m2), and this is
best possible among deterministic voting rules.
Proof Sketch. For the upper bound, observe that the winning
alternative a under Plurality must appear at the first position
...Position 1
Position 2
Figure 1: The instance used in the lower bound proof of the theorem.
of the rankings of least n/m agents by the pigeonhole prin-
ciple. Since the values are unit-sum, these agents must have
value at least 1/m for a, and thus the social welfare of a is at
least n/m2. On the other hand, the maximum social welfare
of any alternative is n, and the bound follows.
For the lower bound, see the instance of Figure 1, where
(a) there is a set of m− 2 alternatives such that each of them
appears at position 1 in the rankings of n/(m−2) agents, and
(b) each of the remaining two alternatives appear at position 2
in the rankings of n/2 agents. Any deterministic voting rule
must select either one of the first m − 2 alternatives or one
of the remaining two alternatives, and has no way of distin-
guishing between alternatives in each group; therefore we can
assume without loss of generality that the rule selects either
the alternative shaded dark gray or the alternative shaded light
gray in the figure. Let the values of the agents that rank the
dark gray alternative first be 1/m for all alternatives. Let the
values of all the remaining agents that rank the light gray al-
ternative second be 1 for their top-ranked alternative and 0 for
all others. Finally, let the values of all the agents that rank the
blue alternative second be 1/2 for their top two alternatives
and zero for the rest. Observe that these values are unit-sum.
The social welfare of both the light gray and the dark gray al-
ternatives is n/(m(m−2)), whereas the social welfare of the
blue alternative is n/4, yielding a lower bound Ω(m2).
Randomization proved to be a powerful tool in the quest
to achieve improved distortion bounds, overcoming the sharp
impossibility results for deterministic rules. A randomized
rule outputs a probability distribution over alternatives rather
than a single alternative, and its distortion is defined with
respect to the expected social welfare that it achieves. The
distortion of randomized rules was most notably studied by
Boutilier et al. [2015], who designed a particularly involved
voting rule with distortion O(
√
m · log∗m). They also
presented the following much simpler rule that achieves a
slightly inferior bound of O(
√
m · logm):
Voting Rule ([Boutilier et al., 2015]). With probability 1/2,
select an alternative uniformly at random, and with probabil-
ity 1/2, select every alternative j ∈ A with probability that
is proportional to j’s harmonic score, computed based on the
harmonic scoring vector (1, 1/2, ..., 1/m), which assigns to
every alternative a score of 1/` for each appearance at posi-
tion ` in the rankings of the agents.
Boutilier et al. [2015] also proved a general lower bound
of Ω(
√
m) on the achievable distortion of randomized rules,
thus effectively settling the problem for the single-winner
case. Despite this fact, as we will see in Section 5, the single-
winner normalized social choice setting still offers rather
fruitful ground for further work on interesting variants of the
problem.
Beyond the single-winner setting
Many interesting multi-winner extensions have also been
studied over the years. Indicatively, Caragiannis et al. [2017]
considered the problem of selecting a subset (committee) of k
alternatives that maximizes the social welfare, when the value
of each agent for a committee of alternatives is defined as
the maximum value she derives from the committee’s mem-
bers. They showed almost tight bounds for both determinis-
tic and randomized rules as functions of m and k. Benadè
et al. [2017] considered the participatory budgeting problem,
where we are given a budget, each alternative has an associ-
ated cost, and the goal is to choose a subset of alternatives so
as to maximize the social welfare of the agents while ensuring
that the total cost of the chosen alternatives does not exceed
the budget. They showed several tight bounds for many dif-
ferent types of input given by the agents, such as knapsack
votes, rankings by value, rankings by value for money, and
threshold approval votes. Finally, Benadè et al. [2019] stud-
ied the distortion of voting rules that output rankings of alter-
natives rather than subsets, and showed that bounds that are
qualitatively similar to those for the single-winner setting can
be achieved by randomized rules.
3 Metric Social Choice
In the normalized social choice setting discussed in the previ-
ous section, the values of the agents for the alternatives sum
up to 1 but can otherwise be highly arbitrary. However, in
many applications (such as elections), voters usually prefer
candidates that express opinions which are closer to their own
personal beliefs, and thus the values are determined by an
“ideological distance”. For example, one can envision ideo-
logical axes from “liberal” to “conservative”, or from “liber-
tarian” to “authoritarian”, and the preferences of the agents as
points in the space defined by these axes.
More generally, we can think of the agents and the alter-
natives as points in a (possibly high-dimensional, e.g., cor-
responding to multiple political issues or ideological dimen-
sions) metric space, in which the triangle inequality is sat-
isfied (see also [Merrill III et al., 1999; Enelow and Hinich,
1984]). Instead of thinking about values and the social wel-
fare objective, in this setting it is more natural to talk about
costs and the analogous social cost objective, which we aim
to minimize. In particular, the cost of an agent for an alter-
native equals their distance in the space, the agents rank the
alternatives in a non-decreasing order of their costs, and the
social cost of an alternative is the total cost of the agents for
this alternative. Then, the distortion of a voting rule is defined
as the ratio of the social cost of the alternative chosen by the
rule over the minimum social cost, when given as input the
ordinal preferences of the agents.
An example very similar to Example 1 shows that the dis-
tortion of any deterministic voting rule in the metric social
choice setting is at least 3; see Figure 2. However, in con-
trast to the normalized setting from Section 2, the metric do-
main restriction makes it possible to achieve small constant
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Figure 2: An example showing that no deterministic voting rule can
achieve a distortion better than 3 in the metric social choice setting.
Since n/2 agents prefer a to b and n/2 agents prefer b to a, without
loss of generality, any rule may select a as the winner for a social
cost of n/4 + n/2 = 3n/4. On the other hand, the optimal alterna-
tive b has social cost n/4.
by Anshelevich et al. [2015], who initiated the study of dis-
tortion in the metric setting and showed that the well-known
Copeland rule achieves a distortion of 5.
Anshelevich et al. [2015] further conjectured that the lower
bound of 3 provided by the example of Figure 2 must be
the tight bound for deterministic rules, and in fact that it
can be achieved by the well-known Ranked Pairs rule. In
the years that followed, a succession of papers made signif-
icant progress towards resolving this conjecture. Skowron
and Elkind [2017] showed that the distortion of every posi-
tional scoring rule is Ω(
√
logm), without however providing
any scoring rule with distortion better than O(m). They also
showed that the distortion of the Single Transferable Vote
(STV) rule is between Ω(
√
logm) and O(logm). Goel et
al. [2017] were the first to disprove that the Ranked Pairs rule
matches the bound of 3, by presenting a lower bound of 5
for it; its exact distortion was later shown to be Θ(
√
m) by
Kempe [2020a]. Munagala and Wang [2019] made signifi-
cant progress towards resolving the conjecture by designing
a novel voting rule that broke the barrier of 5 and achieved
distortion 4.236. They also identified many important prop-
erties that would suffice to achieve the conjectured bound of
3. Based on these properties, the conjecture was finally pos-
itively resolved very recently by Gkatzelis et al. [2020], who
designed the following plurality matching voting rule.
Voting Rule ([Gkatzelis et al., 2020]). For every alternative
j ∈ A, construct the integral domination graph of j, which is
a bipartite graph with the nodes of both sides corresponding
to agents, and each edge (x, y) between agents x and y in-
dicating that x prefers alternative j to the favorite alternative
of y. Return an alternative whose integral domination graph
admits a perfect matching; such an alternative is guaranteed
to exist.
These results have impressive and counter-intuitive impli-
cations. They state that, as long as agents and alternatives
correspond to points in a metric space, it is always possible
to choose a close-to-optimal alternative based only on the or-
dinal rankings of the agents, without even the need to know
their actual locations in the space.
Randomized Rules
Randomized voting rules have also been considered in the
metric setting by Anshelevich and Postl [2017], who showed
that randomization is able to break the barrier of 3 suggested
by the example of Figure 2, albeit only by a small amount
which vanishes as the number of agents becomes large. In
particular, they showed that Random Dictatorship (which se-
lects an agent uniformly at random and outputs her favorite
alternative) has distortion 3 − 2/n, and complemented this
with a lower bound of 2 on the distortion of any randomized
rule, which holds even when the metric space is a simple line.
Kempe [2020b] presented a randomized rule that has distor-
tion 3 − 2/m, which is slightly better than that of Random
Dictatorship when n is large but m is small. However, the
following is still a major open question.
Open problem 1. What is the best possible distortion for
randomized social choice rules in the metric setting?
Progress has been made for some special cases, such as
the line metric, for which Feldman et al. [2016] presented a
randomized rule, the Spike mechanism, with a tight distor-
tion bound of 2. Fain et al. [2017] also considered restricted
spaces called median graphs, and showed that it is possible
to achieve a distortion of almost 1.218, via a sequential de-
liberation rule. Finally, Anshelevich and Postl [2017] also
introduced the notion of α-decisiveness to measure the pref-
erence strength of an agent for her top choice over her second
choice, and showed upper and lower bounds parameterized
by this quantity.
Limited Ordinal Information
While the bulk of papers on distortion in metric social choice
settings have focused on rules that in general take as input
complete rankings, there has also been work on rules that re-
quire incomplete ordinal information, motivated by the fact
that some rules like Plurality and Random Dictatorship es-
sentially only need to know the favorite alternatives of the
agents. In this context, Gross et al. [2017] showed a lower
bound of 3−2/bm/kc on the distortion when the agents sub-
mit top-k rankings for k < m/2, and showed that a very
simple randomized rule, which asks random agents for their
favorite alternatives until two of them agree, has many nice
axiomatic properties and is almost optimal in terms of distor-
tion when the number of alternatives is not too large.
Fain et al. [2019] studied voting rules that require the
agents to compare only a constant number of pairs of alterna-
tives (constant sample complexity) and presented the Random
Referee rule, which achieves a constant squared distortion, a
measure of the variance of the distortion of randomized rules.
Furthermore, for any constant k, they showed that no rule that
elicits only top-k rankings can have squared distortion that
is sublinear in m, and presented the Random Oligarchy rule
with distortion almost matching the lower bound of 3− 2/m
for k = 1. As mentioned above, this small gap was later re-
solved by Kempe [2020b]. He mainly focused on determin-
istic rules and showed that the distortion of rules that take as
input the alternatives that the agents rank in a given set of k
positions is Θ(m/k). Moreover, he showed that the distortion
of rules that require the agents to submit b bits of information
about their rankings is Ω(m/b).
Other Settings
Several papers have also studied variations of the main metric
setting by making different assumptions about the origin of
the alternatives, the behavior of the agents, and the objective.
In particular, Cheng et al. [2017] considered a probabilistic
model in which there are only two alternatives that are inde-
pendently drawn from the population of agents. They showed
that the distortion of the majority rule is between 1.5 and 2
for arbitrary metric spaces, and improves to 1.716 for the line
metric. In follow-up work, Cheng et al. [2018] extended their
analysis to the case where multiple alternatives are randomly
chosen from the set of agents, and showed bounds on the dis-
tortion of positional scoring rules. Borodin et al. [2019] stud-
ied primary voting systems wherein there are political parties
and agents affiliated with those vote to choose the party repre-
sentatives, who then compete in the general elections. Their
main results were that every voting rule is guaranteed to per-
form almost as well under the primary system as under the
direct system (in which all alternatives are candidates in the
election), but not vice versa.
Ghodsi et al. [2021] considered settings with two alterna-
tives, in which some agents are allowed to abstain from the
election process in case they are pretty much indifferent be-
tween the alternatives or the distance from their favorite al-
ternative is sufficiently large. They presented a probabilistic
model to capture these properties and characterized the dis-
tortion of the majority rule.
Pierczynski and Skowron [2019] focused on approval-
based preferences according to which the agents do not rank
the alternatives, but instead list those that they approve. Be-
sides showing that the distortion of the approval rule is un-
bounded, they also introduced the notion of acceptability-
based distortion, which aims to capture how far away the
chosen alternative is from the alternative that is approved by
the most agents. For this definition of distortion, they showed
bounds for well-known rules such as Plurality, Borda, Ranked
Pairs, and Copeland. Jaworski and Skowron [2020] studied
the distortion of multi-winner rules for the election of a com-
mittee, whose quality is determined by the extent to which
the decisions it makes on binary issues are consistent to the
preferences of the agents on those issues.
4 Other Problems and Extensions
Distortion has also been considered in many other settings
that have either been studied under the general umbrella of
social choice theory, or are very much related.
Matching and Other Graph Problems
The one-sided matching problem (also known as house allo-
cation) is a classic problem in economics [Hylland and Zeck-
hauser, 1979], where n agents have preferences over a set
of n items, and the goal is to match each agent to a single
item in order to maximize the social welfare, defined as the
total value of the agents for the items they are matched to.
The problem was first studied in the context of distortion by
Filos-Ratsikas et al. [2014], who showed that Random Serial
Dictatorship (e.g., see [Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1998])
has distortion O(
√
n), and furthermore, this is best possi-
ble among all rules that take as input the ordinal preferences
of the agents induced by their underlying normalized val-
ues. Recently, for the same setting, Amanatidis et al. [2021]
showed that the best possible deterministic rule for one-sided
matching has distortion Θ(n2).
Anshelevich and Sekar [2016a; 2016b] and Abramowitz
and Anshelevich [2018] studied the distortion in maximum
weight matching and many other graph problems such as
maximum k-Sum, densest k-Subgraph, and maximum trav-
elling salesperson (TSP). They primarily focused on the case
of symmetric values that satisfy the triangle inequality and
presented a general framework for designing greedy rules
that achieve small constant distortion bounds. For instance,
among other results, they showed that deterministic rules
can achieve a distortion bound of 2 for maximum-weight
matching and maximum-TSP, whereas randomized rules can
achieve bounds of 1.6 and 1.88 for those two problems re-
spectively. Anshelevich and Zhu [2018] studied a general fa-
cility assignment model with the goal of coming up with a
(possibly constrained) assignment of agents to facilities. For
many different optimization objectives, they showed a black-
box reduction which converts a cardinal rule for the problem
into an ordinal rule with small distortion. In particular, they
showed that the distortion of many facility assignment and
matching problems is at most 3 when the possible locations
of the facilities are public knowledge, but only ordinal pref-
erences of the agents for the facilities are known.
Truthfulness and Distortion
In most of the aforementioned results, the implicit assump-
tion was that when agents are asked to submit their ordinal
preference rankings, they do so honestly. In many cases, how-
ever, the agents might have incentives to misreport their pref-
erences, if that could result in a more favorable outcome (e.g.,
the election of a more preferred alternative, or the allocation
of a more preferable item). In such a case, we would like
to design rules that do not provide incentives for such strate-
gic behavior; these are typically called truthful mechanisms
and are rooted in the principles of mechanism design (e.g, see
[Nisan and others, 2007]).
For the normalized social choice setting, Bhaskar et
al. [2018] studied multi-winner elections and participatory
budgeting problems. The main takeaway from their results
was that essentially the best randomized truthful mechanisms
are ordinal, and are in fact asymptotically almost as good (up
to logarithmic factors) as the best ordinal non-truthful rules.
The single-winner setting was studied previously by Filos-
Ratsikas and Miltersen [2014], albeit for a different normal-
ization (known as unit-range), and later on by Caragiannis et
al. [2018] for a related hybrid social choice setting. In the
metric setting, and the facility location problem in particular,
Feldman et al. [2016] considered different degrees of expres-
siveness in terms of the agents’ preferences, and proved upper
and lower bounds on the distortion of truthful mechanisms.
Even before Bhaskar et al. [2018] reached a similar con-
clusion, Filos-Ratsikas et al. [2014] observed that the best
truthful mechanisms are ordinal in the one-sided matching
setting described earlier. In particular, they showed that the
O(
√
n) bound of random serial dictatorship (which is both
ordinal and truthful) is best possible among all truthful mech-
anisms. Caragiannis et al. [2016] studied the same rule for the
minimum-cost metric matching problem, and showed that its
distortion is between Ω(n0.29) and O(n). This is in fact the
best known upper bound for any ordinal rule in this setting,
even non-truthful ones. To this end, we have the following
open problem.
Open problem 2. What is the distortion of the best ordinal
rule for the minimum-cost metric matching problem? What if
we also require truthfulness?
5 Generalizations of Distortion
While there are still several interesting open questions in the
classic settings described above, in this section we would like
to highlight a more recent stream of work which views the
distortion as a more general concept of measuring the loss
of efficiency due to having access to incomplete information.
We believe this opens up many intriguing avenues for future
investigations. In particular, these works refine the notion of
distortion to capture scenarios in which the loss of efficiency
is not necessarily because the agents express ordinal prefer-
ences, but because there is only limited access to the complete
cardinal information. Some works consider settings in which
the provided information is in a sense “less than cardinal but
more than ordinal”, whereas others explore the limits of com-
munication between the agents and the designer, which inher-
ently results in some information loss. Finally, some recent
papers consider the loss of information that is incurred by
making decisions in a distributed manner. We highlight some
of the recent results below, as well as areas for future work.
Beyond Ordinal Information
As discussed in the Introduction, the standard argument in
favor of ordinal preferences is based on the cognitive limita-
tions of the agents. However, one can conceivably consider
settings where some limited additional information of a car-
dinal nature is available, without imposing a large cognitive
overhead on the agents.
Along those lines, Amanatidis et al. [2020] studied deter-
ministic rules for single-winner social choice that have ac-
cess to the ordinal preferences of the agents and can also
learn some of their numerical values by appropriately asking
a small number of queries to the agents. They showed that a
single query per agent is enough to achieve distortion O(m)
(improving the bound of Θ(m2) achieved by ordinal rules),
and designed a rule that (as special cases) achieves distortion
O(
√
m) by making O(logm) queries per agent (thus match-
ing the best bound possible for ordinal randomized rules), and
constant distortion by making O(log2m) queries per agent;
quite remarkably, these bounds holds even without any nor-
malization assumptions. Moreover, the authors showed that
it is impossible to obtain sublinear distortion with a single
query per agent, and also that ω(logm) queries per agent are
necessary to achieve constant distortion.
Amanatidis et al. [2020] conjectured that it should be pos-
sible to achieve distortion O(
√
m) by asking only a constant
number of queries per agent and constant distortion by ask-
ing Θ(logm) queries per agent. Another interesting direction
is to consider randomized rules in the context of this setting,
where randomization can be used in either the query phase,
the election phase, or both. This line of work raises the fol-
lowing conceptual open question.
Open problem 3. Which other settings admit interesting
tradeoffs between the distortion and the number of queries?
Follow-up works [Amanatidis et al., 2021; Ma et al., 2020]
identified the one-sided matching problem and several of its
generalizations as such settings, and showed quantitatively
similar tradeoffs between the number of queries and the dis-
tortion. It would be very interesting to see if a similar ap-
proach can be applied to the metric social choice setting,
where the bounds are already small constants and significant
improvements are more difficult to obtain.
In the metric setting, Abramowitz et al. [2019] also con-
sidered the case where the agents provide limited cardinal
information on top of their ordinal preferences, by indicat-
ing preference strengths (the voters’ passion). In particular,
for each agent i and every pair of alternatives a and b, the
voting rule has access to the ratio of the distances of agent
i to alternatives a and b. The authors showed that there exist
deterministic rules with distortion
√
2 when there only two al-
ternatives, and distortion 2 when there are more alternatives.
They also considered rules that do not know the exact prefer-
ence strengths, but only whether these strengths exceed a pre-
defined threshold τ , and showed how the distortion bounds
change as functions of τ . Perhaps the most general concep-
tual research direction is the following.
Open problem 4. What other meaningful ways of eliciting
limited cardinal information can be used to improve the dis-
tortion in metric or normalized social choice?
We remark that the idea of eliciting cardinal information
has also been present in earlier works. In particular, Benadè
et al. [2017], and later on Bhaskar et al. [2018], considered
(deterministic or randomized) threshold approval queries, in
which the agents are asked to list all the alternatives that they
value higher than a specified threshold.
Communication complexity
Mandal et al. [2019] considered similar tradeoffs between in-
formation and distortion, but without assuming a priori ac-
cess to the ordinal preferences of the agents. Instead, they fo-
cused on voting rules that consist of an elicitation part which
collects a specific number of bits of information per agent
about their values, and an aggregation part which uses this
information to decide a single winning alternative. Mandal et
al. [2019] proposed a voting rule that uses deterministic elic-
itation and aggregation, and achieves distortion d with com-
munication complexity O(m log(d logm)/d). Furthermore,
they showed that to achieve distortion d, any voting rule us-
ing deterministic elicitation must have communication com-
plexity Ω(m/d2), whereas any voting rule using randomized
elicitation must have communication complexity Ω(m/d3).
In follow-up work, Mandal et al. [2020] improved these
tradeoffs by showing tight bounds (up to logarithmic fac-
tors) on the communication complexity necessary to achieve
distortion d. Specifically, by exploiting recent advances in
streaming algorithms and making a connection to the litera-
ture on communication complexity from theoretical computer
science, they showed a bound of Θ̃(m/d) for deterministic
elicitation and a bound of Θ̃(m/d3) for randomized elicita-
tion. Mandal et al. [2020] also considered the multi-winner
setting of Caragiannis et al. [2017], and showed that the re-
quired communication complexity for achieving distortion d
is Θ̃(m/(kd)) for deterministic elicitation and Θ̃(m/(kd3))
for randomized elicitation, where k is the number of winners
selected. While these two papers have provided an almost
complete picture of the communication complexity of single-
and multi-winner voting rules, one could ask similar ques-
tions for other settings.
Open problem 5. Which other settings admit interesting
tradeoffs between distortion and communication?
Settings like the one-sided matching and its generaliza-
tions seem like good candidates, and so does the metric social
choice setting.
Distributed settings
In all the papers discussed so far, the voting rules operate by
collecting the preferences of all agents and then aggregating
them into a common decision in a single step. However, in
many important applications (such as presidential elections
in the US) the aggregation process is distributed, in the sense
that the agents are partitioned into districts and vote locally
therein to choose representative alternatives, which are then
aggregated into a final collective outcome. With this in mind,
Filos-Ratsikas et al. [2020] initiated the study of the distor-
tion in distributed settings, aiming to capture the loss of effi-
ciency not only due to the possibly limited expressiveness of
the agents’ preferences, but also due to not having full access
to the details of the local decisions within the districts.
Filos-Ratsikas et al. [2020] focused on the unit-sum single-
winner setting and bounded the distortion of deterministic
distributed rules, which use classic voting rules for the local
district elections, and choose as overall winner the alterna-
tive that is the representative of the most districts (or has the
largest total weight among the representatives in case the dis-
tricts are weighted). Their results showed that the distributed
nature of such mechanisms leads to considerably larger dis-
tortion compared to their centralized counterparts. Later on,
Filos-Ratsikas and Voudouris [2020] studied the distortion of
deterministic distributed rules for discrete and continuous fa-
cility location on the line (single-dimensional metric setting),
and showed tight bounds for the social cost objective that are
small constants, both in general and under truthfulness con-
straints. There are many interesting open questions to be an-
swered in distributed settings.
Open problem 6. What is the distortion of randomized dis-
tributed mechanisms? How do the distortion bounds look like
when the goal is to choose a committee of alternatives or lo-
cate more facilities? What about general metric spaces and
other settings?
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